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Naturalizing Grace
Leibniz’s Reshaping of the two Kingdoms of Nature and Grace between 
Malebranche and Kant 
abstract:  While in Malebranche the specifi c laws of grace were structurally homogeneous to 
those of nature, in Leibniz’s view the system of nature, unfolding according to its own rules, at 
the same time satisfi es the moral requirements. Human beings are subjected both to the natural 
laws, as embodied souls, and to the jurisdiction of the moral law, as citizens of the ‘city of God’. 
Th e realm of grace is a “moral world within the natural world”: harmony seems to be required. 
And wh at he wants to get from such harmony is that fi nal conciliation of subjective conscious-
ness and divine justice also called for by Locke. But this eschatological outcome is thought of 
by him in a more intra-mundane way, that is, the reconciliation of nature with the moral ends 
of the ‘kingdom of grace’ is projected into the future development of this world. Notably, the 
conceptual framework expressed by the Leibnizian ‘kingdom of grace’ will be taken again by Kant 
from a transcendental point of view.
sunto: Mentre in Malebranche le leggi specifi che della grazia erano strutturalmente omogenee 
a quelle della natura, secondo Leibniz il sistema della natura, sviluppandosi secondo le proprie 
regole, soddisfa allo stesso tempo le esigenze morali. Gli esseri umani sono soggetti sia alle leggi 
naturali, in quanto anime dotate di un corpo, sia alla giurisdizione della legge morale, in quan-
to cittadini della ‘città di Dio’. Il regno della grazia è un “mondo morale nel mondo naturale”: 
un’armonia sembra essere richiesta. E ciò che Leibniz vuole ottenere con tale armonia è quella 
conciliazione fi nale di coscienza soggettiva e giustizia divina richiesta anche da Locke. Ma l’esito 
escatologico è da lui pensato in un modo più intramondano: la riconciliazione della natura con i 
fi ni morali del ‘regno della grazia’ è proiettata nello sviluppo futuro di questo mondo. Signifi ca-
tivamente, il quadro concettuale espresso dal ‘regno della grazia’ leibniziano sarà ripreso da Kant 
da un punto di vista trascendentale.
keyWords: Leibniz; Principles of Nature and Grace; Kingdom of Grace; Harmony; Eschatology
1. introduction
The heading of Leibniz’s Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason (from now on: 
PNG) presents a conceptual dichotomy – that of “nature” and “grace” – lying at the 
very heart of the religious and intellectual struggles of the seventeenth century. At the 
turn of the new century, however, when the PNG are written (1714), the big theological 
controversies begin to fade away in the European culture, while many theological con-
cepts take the way of secularization. Romano Guardini indicated as a peculiar trait of 
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the modern age the transvaluation of what was originally Christian – i.e., the gift, both 
supernatural and historical, of a certain religious experience – into a structural feature 
of the universal human nature, something able to be detected, in principle, by the pure 
light of natural reason.1 From this point of view, the development of the meaning of 
‘grace’ in Leibniz’s late writings could well assume a paradigmatic value.
Speaking about the ‘principles’ of nature and grace, however, as if they were two 
complemetary ‘systems’, is not a Leibnizian invention, but reminds us of a close ante-
cedent: Malebranche’s Treatise on Nature and Grace. Hence, it is worth taking our first 
step from this work of thirty years before.
1. the malebranchian model
1.1. General Laws: A Common Pattern for both Nature and Grace
Malebranche’s Traité de la nature et de la grâce2 presents a rationalistically-minded theod-
icy, majestic as much as disconcerting, which provoked Antoine Arnauld’s harsh reaction, 
thus triggering an epoch-making controversy between the two post-Cartesian thinkers. 
What is most peculiar of Malebranche is his parallel treatment of “nature” 
and “grace” as two lawlike systems. God – the only true causal agent in both fields 
– acts in them according to different sets of laws. Though being different, how-
ever, these rules present a fundamental homogeneity in their formal structure:
Since it is the same God who is the author of the order of grace and of that 
of nature, it is necessary that these two orders be in agreement with respect to 
everything that they contain, which marks the wisdom and the power of their 
author. Thus, since God is a general cause whose wisdom has no limits, it is nec-
essary for the reasons which I stated before, that in the order of grace as well as in 
that of nature, he acts as a general cause; and that having as his end his glory in 
the construction of his Church, he establish the simplest and the most general laws, 
which have by their effect the greatest amount of wisdom and fruitfulness.3
The fundamental character of generality belonging to the laws – a property that can be 
further specified in terms of universality, constancy, simplicity – is for Malebranche a 
capital mark of value and the key of his solution of the theodicean problems: God does 
never act on the ground of any particular wills, because His wisdom obliges Him to 
conform to general rules. But then, all particular unwelcomed effects should be seen as 
the unavoidable by-products of the unfolding of the causal chains according to those 
general laws. 
Now, this type of explanation/justification is applied by Malebranche not only to 
the evils caused by the course of nature (monsters, accidents, natural disasters), but is 
1.  Guardini 1950.
2.  First published in 1680, the work took its final form with the 1684 (fourth) edition, now 
in OM, V. Quotations are drawn from the English translation in R. For a classic commentary 
to these aspects of Malebranche’s thought, see Gueroult 1959.
3.  R 126; Traité, Discourse I, Part II, §37. Italics in this and the other quotations is mine.
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also extended to the arduous and intensively disputed questions raised by the distribu-
tion of divine graces.
1.2. The Domains of Grace 
But what are exactly, for Malebranche, the domains of “nature” and “grace” respective-
ly? “Nature” is far from being identified solely with the physical world. The laws of na-
ture, indeed, should be further specified in three sets of rules, governing, respectively, 
(a) the (mechanical) interactions among bodies; (b) the series of thoughts and feelings 
in our souls; (c) the reciprocal (indirect) determination between events belonging to (a) 
and (b).
The world of “Grace”, instead, is – according to the traditional theological sense 
– the field of God’s super-natural actions which are the proper source of human sal-
vation; more precisely, graces in the proper and strict sense are “graces of feeling”, 
that is to say divine modifications of our feelings (sentiments). Traditionally, this was 
the field of God’s totally free, particular acts of will, over and above any “law” by 
which God Himself could have somehow vinculated His power and will accordig to 
the ordinary course of nature. Malebranche’s audacious idea was instead, as I antici-
pated, to apply the same causal-nomological model even to the distribution of graces. 
In the natural world, as is well known, the movements of bodies and the mod-
ifications and volitions of minds play the role of occasional causes for the exercise of 
(divine) real casuality according to its general laws. In the distribution of graces, no 
such natural event can play this role. The source of the particular specifications in 
the distribution of the divine grace – hence, what plays here the role of occasional 
cause – should be looked for, instead, in the particular acts of will of Christ. These 
acts, in their turn, are bound to the conditions and constraints of his human nature. 
Thus, the limits of Christ as a human being and their interplay with the variety of 
circumstances, together with God’s maintenance of the general rule governing the 
distribution of His grace, explain the particularization of the effects of the general rule 
and the only apparent randomness or injustice in the distribution of graces themselves. 
The fields of “nature” and “grace”, however, cannot be sharply separated for Male-
branche. There are other graces, indeed, that have as their outcome the enlightement of 
our understanding; now, these “graces of light” (to be distnguished from those of “feel-
ing”, the properly super-natural ones) are included within the order of nature: they are 
also dispensed by God (remember that for Malebranche every effect, natural as it may 
be, is brought about directly by God), but by God as our creator, not as our Redeemer:
All these kinds of grace – if one wants to leave them that name – being the graces of the 
Creator, the general laws of these graces are the general laws of nature. For one must 
take note that sin has not destroyed nature, although it has corrupted it. The general 
laws of the communication of motion are always the same; and those of the union 
of the soul and the body are not changed.4
4.  R 158; Traité, Discourse II, P. II, §44. Actually Malebranche goes further with an important 
precision: “except in this alone, that what was only a union with respect to our mind, has been 
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Accordingly, our mental movements of attention will be the relevant – and natural – 
occasional causes which determine the enlightement of our mind.
More generally, many other natural causes (e.g. also physical ones, such as physical 
accidents or fortuitous personal encounters) can determine our attitude towards God 
and salvation. Thus, we can adopt an even wider sense of grace, considering “grace” every 
event which – while always obeying the general rules of nature at the different levels of 
creation – does have some relevant positive impact on our salvation and eternal destiny.5
Observe that in the Malebranchian framework the laws connect also events 
situated at different levels of being (e.g. physical and mental events) so that the dif-
ferent (quasi-) casual chains ruled by their respective different laws cross each other 
and interfere in many complex ways. Malebranche is prepared to accept, and even 
to emphasize, this concurrence of a multiplicity of (quasi-) causal factors which, tak-
en together, determine the patterns of grace.6 This is his peculiar way to interpret 
the union of nature and grace – a traditional tenet of Catholic doctrine, in contrast 
with the sharp opposition of the two principles in the theology of the Reformation.
1.3. The Supreme Order and the Nature/ Grace Relationship 
The complexity of interrelations among different lawlike patterns raises the question 
about the resulting global plan of the world. Does God simply ratify the outcome of 
this immensely complex intercrossing of different sets of general laws, on one hand, 
changed into dependence [after the original sin] (…) For we are now dependent on the body 
to which we were only united” (ibidem).
5.  “since external graces which do not act immediately in the mind, none the less enter into 
the order of the predestination of the saints, I regard them still as true graces. In a word I be-
lieve that one can give the name of grace to all natural effects, when they have a relation to salvation 
(…) If, however, one does not consent to this, I have no wish to dispute over words” (R 157; Traité, 
Discours II, P. I, §43).
6.  “Since grace is conjoined with nature, all the movements of our soul and of our body have 
some relation to salvation (…) We know not at all what is advantageous to us. But we know 
well that there is nothing so indifferent in itself, that it has not some relation to our salvation, 
because of the mixture and combination of effects which depend on the general laws of nature, with 
those which depend on the general laws of grace” (R 157; Traité, Discours II, P. I, §42); “It is cer-
tain that natural effects combine and mix in an infinity of ways with the effects of grace, and that 
the order of nature augments or diminishes the efficacy or the effects of the order of grace – according 
to the different ways in which these two orders mix with each other. Death, which according to the 
general laws of nature comes at a certain time to a good or to a bad prince, to a good or to a 
bad bishop, causes a great deal of good or evil in the Church: because similar accidents bring 
about a very great variety in the sequence of effects which depend upon the order of grace. Now God 
wills to save all men by the simplest means. Thus one can and even must say, in general, that 
he has chosen the time, the place, the ways which, in the fullness of time, and according to the 
general laws of nature and of grace, must (all things be equal) cause to enter into the Church a 
greater number of predestined persons. God does everything for his glory. Thus of all possible 
combinations of nature and grace, he has chosen, through the infinite extent of his knowledge, that 
which should form the most perfect Church, the most worthy of his greatness and his wisdom” (R 
160; Traité, Discours II, P. I, §48).
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and particular circumstances on the other? Are generality and simplicity the only su-
preme rules He wants to follow? Or do other criteria intervene, to better harmonize the 
composition of the different lawlike chains?
Malebranche introduces the notion of “Order” to indicate the supreme rule gov-
erning divine wisdom and action.7 This “Order” reflects a hierarchical scale of values, 
which should guide the attitude of a rational agent with respect to all possible choices 
and all different beings. According to this objective hierarchy, for instance, the life 
and happiness of a human being should be taken as more valuable than those of a 
non-rational animal. As a consequence, this type of criterion seems to determine a 
moral obligation to put the perfection and happiness of human beings above every 
other value – hence to subordinate all other laws to the salvific order of grace, though 
maintaining also, as far as possible, the formal constraints of simplicity/generality. The 
way of balancing these different criteria and requirements, and their possible mutu-
al tension, have been the object of intensive discussion in Malebranche’s scholarship. 
In any event, we are faced with an implicit shift in the way of conceiving the order 
governing divine action, and more specifically grace itself. The idea of one general, or glob-
al, will of God is maintained. But now its content no longer appears as a purely formal rule, 
but rather as a specific system of ends, according to which all actions and rules are evaluated.
From this perspective, a hierarchical, finalistic relationship between the differ-
ent “kingdoms” can be envisaged: Malebranche, in fact, goes as far as to suggest that 
the divine decision to create bodies – and with them the whole order of physical na-
ture – is finalized to the ends of the order of grace understood in this axiological 
way: in Malebranche’s words, to the building of the “eternal Church” in all its variety.
To justify the persisting disharmonies between this notion of order as (moral) per-
fection and the order of nature, Malebranche can appeal to the theological doctrine of 
original sin, by which nature has been somehow corrupted, whereas the originary plan 
of creation envisaged a systematic subordination of the order of nature to that of grace:
Here one must take note that the essential rule of the will of God is order; 
and that if man (for example) had not sinned (…) then, order not permit-
ting that he be punished, the natural laws of the communication of motion would 
never been able to make him unhappy: for, the law of order which wills that 
the just person suffer nothing despite himself being essential to God, the arbi-
trary law of the communication of motion must necessarily be subjected to it.8 
After man’s sin, this perfect subordination of the working of the general laws to the 
supreme law of (moral) order has been lost. Malebranche, however, considers also the 
possibility that, even in the present state of our world, God alters in a miracuolus way the 
actual order of nature, in order to better harmonize it with the superior ends dictated by 
the supreme order: 
7.  R 119; Traité, Discours I, P. I, §20. The notion will gain more and more importance in 
Malebranche’s later metaphysical works.
8.  R 119; Traité, Discourse I, P. I, §20.
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There are, still, some rare occasions on which these general laws of motion ought 
to cease to produce their effect. But it is not the case that God changes his laws, or 
corrects himself; it is because of the order of grace, which that of nature must serve, 
that miracles happen in certain circumstances.9
Admittedly, these occasions are “rare”. It is interesting to see how Malebranche, even 
in later works, tends to provide some explanation of many miracles (e. g. of several 
miracles of the Old Testament) in terms of general laws, if not properly in a naturalistic 
way. What is especially relevant for us here, is the fact that in putting forward this type 
of explanation he gives an illustration of the way in which nature, while not changing 
any of its laws, can serve the higher ends of God according to the highest order (and 
even to the distribution of His grace in the strict sense).
2. the leibnizian model
2.1. From the Treatise to the Discourse: the Redeemer and the King
Leibniz’s systematic usage of the nature/grace pair is clearly inspired by the Male-
branchian model. Not accidentally it appears in the Discourse of Metaphysics, a text 
whose themes are clearly presented and organized with an eye to the most recent de-
velopments of Cartesian philosophy, in particular to Malebranche’s ideas and his dis-
cussion with Antoine Anauld (the latter being, after all, the designed addressee of the 
draft of the Discourse itself). Now, the Treatise on Nature and Grace was then one of the 
last important texts published by Malebranche; moreover, the philosophical-theological 
views expressed there were the deepest and truest motivations of Arnauld’s polemical 
attack launched against Malebranche. For his own part, Leibniz was very sensitive to the 
Malebranchian approach to the theodicean issues, its leading ideas – such as the criteria 
of generality, or the working out of a notion of order – and the problems they raised.10 
When passing from Malebranche’s Treatise to Leibniz’s writings, however, we are 
faced with some shift in the usage of the term ‘grace’ and the definition of the related do-
main. To be sure, Leibniz also is intensively concerned, in the Discourse as in many other 
writings, with the specific problem of the divine supernatural aids provided on behalf 
of human salvation, and of the logic of their distribution – that is to say, the proper field 
of “grace” in strictly theological (even in Malebranchian) sense, which was then at the 
centre of the hottest debates between Catholics and Protestants, or between Jesuites and 
Jansenists – but when he speaks about the ‘kingdom of grace’, in contrast to the ‘king-
dom of nature’, usually he is not referring exclusively (or even primarily) to this topic. 
True enough, in a text edited by Couturat we find a definition that, at first sight, 
seems to overlap Malebranche’s “wider” definition of grace, taken as all which contrib-
utes to human salvation:
9.  Ibidem; Traité, Discourse I, P. I, §21.
10.  For a (positive) reference to Malebranche Treatise in the Theodicy, see Théodicée, §204 (GP 
VI, 238). For a general overview on Leibniz’s relationship with Malebranche, see the classic 
Robinet 1955. See also Riley’s Introduction to the Treatise in R.
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When the Grace is contrasted to the Nature, this means to contrast the actions done by 
God as a King to the actions done as the mere author of things. More especial-
ly, however, his actions are meant, which are relevant for human salvation.11 
What is most important, Leibniz identifies the scope of “grace”, in general, as a spe-
cial field of God’s action, distinct from His general action as creator. This distinction 
might be applied also to the case of Malebranche’s ‘proper’ sense of ‘grace’, but it is 
important to observe that this is taken by Leibniz in a quite different way. It is God’s 
role as a ‘King’, indeed, which is connected by hiim to ‘grace’, and the king/grace pair 
is contrasted to the creator/nature one. Now, telling about God as a ‘king’ amounts to 
focusing on His role as the ruler of rational creatures. 
As a matter of fact, it is no longer God’s role as the Redeemer, which qualifies 
the field of grace: every reference to a specific work of redemption, and to Christ – ab-
solutely central in Malebranche’s Treatise – tends here to fade away; not in the sense 
of being abolished, but of being no longer the central topic, being rather absorbed 
within the general consideration of God’s gobal handling as a moral ruler of the world. 
Moreover, God’s action as a ‘king’ is not presented as the implementation of a 
specific lawlike pattern in the distribution of His graces (as is was the case in Male-
branche’s Treatise), but as a different finalistic order which governs a specific sector 
of creation and, through this, is superimposed to the subordinated order of ‘nature’. 
In this sense the Leibnizian rule of ‘grace’ might be rather identified with the Male-
branchian notion of a global moral ‘order’.
2.2. The Domain of Grace, or the City of God
The idea of the “Kingdom of grace”, as opposed to that of “nature”, becomes a peculiar 
Leibnizian tool at least from the Discourse on.12 We find it in the New System13 of ten 
11.  C, 508.
12.  “we must consider God, not only as the principle and cause of all substances and all be-
ings, but also as the head of all persons or intelligent substances and as the absolute monarch of 
the most perfect city or state, such as the universe composed of all spirits together, God himself 
being the most perfect of all spirits” (Discours de métaphysique, §35, A VI, 4, 1584-85; L 326). 
See also Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld, October 168: “As for spirits, that is substances which think 
and are capable of knowing God and discovering eternal truths, I hold that God governs them 
according to laws which differ from those by which he governs the other substances (…) God 
governs the substances of beasts according to the material laws of force or of the transmission 
of motion. But he governs spirits according to the spiritual laws of justice, of which the others are 
incapable. It is for this reason that the substances of beasts can be called material, because the 
economy which God follows with respect to them is that of a worker or a mechanic; but with 
respect to spirits God fulfils the function of a prince or a legislator, which is infinitely higher. 
(...) This is why everything is arranged in such a way that the laws of force or purely material laws 
work together everywhere to carry out the laws of justice or of love, so that nothing can harm the 
souls which are in the hand of God, and everything must work for the greatest good of those 
who love him” (A II, 2, 257, L 347).
13.  “God governs minds as a prince governs his subjects or as a father cares for his children, 
while he deals with other substances, instead, as an engineer handles his machines. Minds thus 
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years later, and finally in the famous couple of texts of Leibniz’s last years, the PNG 
and the Monadology.14 The strucural characters and the usage of this conceptual tool 
remain basically constant during this period (that is to say, in Leibniz’s mature and late 
thought); I try now to explore a bit closer these characters and this usage.
To this aim, it is worth focusing on another notion to which the ‘Kingdom of 
grace’ is usually associated by Leibniz: I mean, the concept (maybe better, the image) 
of the ‘city of God’. To be true, another possible (perhaps more imemdiate) association 
is with the notion, central in the New Testament, of ‘God’s Kingdom’: this is the way 
taken by Leibniz in the last paragraphs of the Discourse.15 Also in this text, however, 
the image of ‘city’ or ‘republic’ neatly prevails; and in the other texts centered on the 
nature/grace dichotomy, the world of ‘grace’ is constantly accompanied by a constel-
lation of kindred political images. Thus, in paragraph 15 of the PNG, one can read:
For this reason all spirits, whether of men or higher beings, enter by virtue of rea-
son and the eternal truths into a kind of society with God and are members of the 
City of God, that is to say, the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest 
and best of monarchs. Here there is no crime without punishment, no good action 
without a proportionate reward, and finally, as much virtue and happiness as is 
possible.16 
Needless to say, the natural link between the biblical theme of the ‘Kingdom of God’ 
and this political imaginery was provided by the great tradition of Augustine’s ‘City 
of God’. The powerful Augustinian notion, however, is transfigured in Leibniz’s ra-
tionalistically-minded reading,17 where it becomes the label for the ideal society which 
embraces God and all rational beings, on the basis of a commonly shared ‘natural right’ 
taken in a strongly univocist way – this ‘natural right’ being nothing but the object 
of his celebrated ‘universal jurisprudence’.18 In this context, God as the true monarch 
– though being qualified in Discourse §35 as ‘absolute’ – still is quite different from a 
dispotic ruler, insofar as He is vinculated by the natural law. 
To sum up, the Leibnizian notion of ‘Kingdom of grace’, turns out to be con-
stantly focussing on: a) God’s moral attributes, such as justice and goodness; b) the 
emergence of beings capable of moral responsibility. 
Leibniz, indeed, usually invokes that notion while introducing the ontological 
distinction he is eager to draw between the generality of simple substances or souls 
have special laws which place them beyond the revolutions of matter, and one can say that all the 
rest is made only for them, these revolutions themselves being adapted to the happiness of the good 
and the punishment of the evil”. Système nouveau (GP IV, 479-480, L 454-455).
14.  PNG, §15 (GP VI, 605); Monadology, §§84-90 (GP VI, 621-623).
15.  In parallel with the usage of this biblical image, the qualification of ‘father’ is contrasted 
with that of ‘architect’, to express the same dichotomy as king (of the spiritual world) and 
creator (of the material world). See also the passage from the New System, cited note 12 above.
16.  PNG, GP VI, 605, L 640.
17.  For some remarks on this reworking, see the chapter devoted to Leibniz in Gilson 1952.
18.  The classic study on Leibniz’s philosophy considered from this viewpoint, accompanied 
by an impressive collection of texts, is Grua 1953.
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on one hand, endowed with (different grades of) perception, and the subset of ration-
al beings on the other, capable of self-knowledge and of grasping necessary truths. 
These characters make of them moral subjects, deserving reward or punishment. 
According to the general law of His ‘kingdom’, or ‘city’, on one hand, God is 
bound to procure the happiness of these higher creatures:
So dear is this consideration to him that the happy and flourishing state of his 
empire, which consists in the greatest possible felicity of its inhabitants, becomes 
his highest law. For happiness is to persons what perfection is to beings. And if the 
highest principle rulig the existence of the physical world is the decree which gives 
it the greatest perfection possible, the highest purpose in the moral world, or the 
city of God which is the noblest part of the universe, should be to spread in it the 
greatest possible happiness.19
And then the further precision comes: this happiness should be proportional to the 
virtue of rational creaures.20 In Leibniz’s view, the ‘kingdom of grace’ obeys the rule of 
charity, or universal benevolence; but it is the ‘charity of wise’, a synonim for justice 
– charity being for Leibniz the highest level of justice itself. The ‘Kingdom of grace’, 
indeed, viewed under the juridical-political equivalences evoked by Leibniz, is, indeed, 
a system of justice, framed around man’s and God’s moral obligations.
In this sense, this system of grace turns out to be rather far from – if not 
even opposite to – the originary theological notion of grace, taken as an essen-
tially gratuitous gift: what is not surprising, given the ‘univocist’ approach of uni-
versal jurisprudence, i. e. the subordination of God and man to a common rule. 
But this issue invites us to consider more closely the Leibnizian opposition of 
‘grace’ to ‘nature’ and their mutual relationship.
The Nature/Grace Distinction: ‘Supernatural’ as ‘Moral’
What about the complementary definition of the scope of ‘nature’ in the Leibnizian 
nature/grace pair? Leibniz usually speaks, as if the relevant term to be harmonized with 
grace were physical nature as such. ‘Physical’, however, does not simply coincide with 
‘mechanical’, in the sense of ruled by efficient causes:
As we have established above a perfect harmony between two natural kingdoms, 
that of efficient and that of final causes, we must also point out here another har-
mony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace, 
19.  Discours de métaphysique, §36 (GP IV, 462, L 327).
20.  “As a result they will always know what they are, otherwise they would be incapable of 
reward and punishment, both of which are essential in a republic and especially in the most perfect 
one where nothing can be overlooked” (ibidem). Leibniz is speaking here about the necessary 
maintenance of self-knowledge; on this more later. For an insightful discussion of the relation-
ship between justice and happiness of rational beings in the Leibnizian world, see Adams 2014.
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that is to say, between God considered as architect of the machine of the universe 
and God considered as monarch of the divine city of spirits.21
Leibniz here is accurate in distinguishing the field of ‘grace’ from other finalistic as-
pects of the world: the ‘realm of grace’, in fact, is far from being simply coextensive 
with the domain of teleology, or of final causes. As is well known, according to Leibniz 
teleological considerations play a role even at the level of the world of bodies, where 
they represent a complementary explanation of physical events, together with efficient 
(mechanical) causality. When speaking about ‘grace’, therefore, a further and different 
finalism is considered, insofar as the whole of natural processess, already guided by 
finalism (functionally, epistemologically, or even esthetically shaped), is now related to 
a further, specifically moral end. 
No to count that the scope of ‘natural’ should likely be extended to embrace 
some psychical processes, they also ruled by lawlike patterns: what is already im-
plicit in the fact that the distinction line is drawn (differently from what done by 
the Cartesian Malebranche) between not-rational souls and intelligent minds.
Accordingly, all this reflects into the new characterization of the ‘Kingdom of 
grace’, that is to say of the sense and scope of ‘supernatural’, taken as the sphere of 
‘moral’ laws (versus “physical” ones, be they even teleological, or psychological). Thus, 
the preceding paragraph of the Monadology tells us that:
This city of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural 
world.22
Moreover: analogous to the way in which in the PNG Leibniz at a point invokes the 
need of passing from ‘physical’ consideration to ‘metaphysical’ ones, already in the 
Discourse he had introduced the topic of the ‘realm of God’ by the need to join ‘moral’ 
to metaphysics: 
But in order to support by natural reasons the view that God will preserve for 
all time not merely our substance but our person, that is to say, the memory and 
knowledge of what we are (…) we must add morals to metaphysics.23
Only that type of consideration, indeed, could establish true immortality, by working 
as a sort of ‘moral postulate’ (to use a bit anachronistically Kant’s later jargon) which 
establishes the immortality (in the proper sense) of rational souls by distinguishing 
it from the unperishability common to all substances in general. I shall consider this 
closer below.24
21.  Monadologie, §87 (GP VI, 622, L 1060). The distinction among these different ‘realms’ is 
neatly illustrated in Phemister 2003, one of the very few studies epressly devoted to an analysis 
of the concept of ‘kingdom of grace’ and its relationship with nature.
22.  Monadologie, §86 (GP VI, 621-622, L 1059).
23.  Discours de métaphysique, §35 (A VI, 4, 1584, L 502).
24.  By the way, the new polarity of ‘physical’ and ‘moral’ could be an echo (at least from the 
terminological point of view, but also from the conceptual one, though reworked, as usual) of 
Malebranche’s analogous polarity, by which the latter distinguished the causal (more exactly, 
naturalizing grace104 105
3. leibniz’s harmony of nature and grace, or the moral nature of nature
3.1. Moral and Natural Order: Distinction and Preminence
In Leibniz’s framework, as we have seen, the elements of Malebranche’s system of na-
ture and grace are profoundly reshaped. While in Malebranche the specific laws of 
grace were structurally homogeneous to those of nature, in Leibniz the contrast of 
God as an ‘architect’ and God as a ‘monarch’ tends to reveal and emphasize a funda-
mental dis-homegeneity beween the two types of laws. The Leibnizian order of ‘grace’ 
is less reducible to a system of (we could say, quasi-Hempelian) causal laws, than the 
occasionalist schema of ‘general laws’; the rules of ‘grace’ have an essentially normative 
character – although in the case of divine action what ought to be the case invariably 
is the case. From this point of view, there is rather some continuity with the other great 
Malebranchian theme of (moral) ‘Order’, at least in its general sense of a set of axiolog-
ical principles.
A precision is required here: one should distinguish this objective recovery of 
the Malebranchian ‘order’ from the other Leibnizian notion (it also a reworking of a 
Malebranchian theme) of a supreme all-encompassing order, actually realized in the 
best of possibile worlds. Admittedly, this also is ultimately determined by axiological 
considerations of perfection, but it already includes their total specification and their 
balancing with all toher parameters. Within this notion, the conceptual tensions which 
emerged In Malebranche’s view turn out to be somehow nuanced and attenuated, inso-
far as this all-encompassing notion of ‘order’ already integrates ethical values and epis-
temological ones (like the simplicity/fecundity balance); besides this, Leibniz’s enlarged 
concept of law tends to relativize the contrast between general and particular wills.
When Leibniz, however, takes the moral order as synonimous of the or-
der of grace, and contrasts it to the order of nature, he is considering more ana-
lytically the single factors of that all-comprehensive universal order: in particu-
lar, he is considering the “moral order” in a strict sense, as being distinct from 
other parameters of the divine evaluation, and in need to be (problematical-
ly) co-ordinated with them. In this sense, we find again Malebanche’s problem of 
the adaptation of the causal-nomological patterns of nature to the moral ends.
Although the moral order properly concerns only a subset of the creat-
ed world, however, and represents only a part of the criteria which guided its cre-
ation, still it maintains a priority, so that the other “sub-orders” or sets of rules 
have to be somehow subordinated and finalized to this higher system of ends.
More concretely, this means that the destiny of rational beings  –  hence, their 
happiness  – is the absolutely privileged end of the cosmic order. Leibniz also sketches in 
his writings some arguments to the effect of showing the necessary connection between 
the basic general criterion of metaphysical perfection and the specific moral criterion of 
quasi-causal) aspects of human action (the ‘physical’ ones) from its moral aspects, the latter 
being deprived of any causal efficacy, but giving to action its moral character through the 
relationship with the exercise of human freedom.
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the happiness of spirits.25
Admittedly, in certain contexts Leibniz warns us that that preminence is 
not as absolute, so that the moral ends of the order of grace (in other terms, God’s 
ends as the king of spirits) can be, at least to a certain extent, sacrified to other 
ends, concerning the whole of the cosmic system and the interest of other (non-ra-
tional) creatures. This point of view is especially developed in some sections of the 
Theodicy, where part of Leibniz’s strategy is to criticize Bayle’s objections as too an-
thropocentric. Accordingly, Leibniz is ready to emphasize that the adjustment of 
‘nature’ and ‘grace’ is a reciprocal one; moreover, he goes on occasionally to admit 
that moral justice and the happiness of rational creatures – or at least of mankind – 
is not always the preminent, let alone the unique goal guiding the divine choice:
I grant that the happiness of intelligent creatures is the principal part of God’s 
design, for they are most like him; but nevertheless I do not see how one can prove 
that to be his sole aim. It is true that the realm of nature must serve the realm of 
grace: but, since all is connected in God’s great design, we must believe that the 
realm of grace is also in some way adapted to that of nature, so that nature preserves 
the utmost order and beauty, to render the combination of the two the most per-
fect that can be. And there is no reason to suppose that God, for the sake of some 
lessening of moral evil, would reverse the whole order of nature. Each perfection or 
imperfection in the creature has its value, but there is none that has an infinite value. 
Thus the moral or physical good and evil of rational creatures does not infinitely 
exceed the good and evil which is simply metaphysical, namely that which lies in 
the perfection of the other creatures.26
Nevertheless, in the texts which typically develop and illustrate the nature/grace po-
larity, the emphasis is always on the preminence of the city of God, and of the related 
moral ends, within the wider context of our world. Moreover, in these contexts the 
happiness due to the spirits is expressly measured according to moral criteria: happiness 
should be distributed according to virtue, and the content of the nature/grace harmony 
ultimately amounts to this. Thus Leibniz, in the selfsame Theodicy, criticizes Bayle for 
the opposite ground as before:
One might thence conclude, according to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacque-
lot, p. 183), “that God created the world only to display his infinite skill in archi-
tecture and mechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no 
part in the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself only 
on skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather than suffer 
some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require”. M. Bayle would 
not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on the system of general 
harmony which I assume, which states that the realm of efficient causes and that 
of final causes are parallel to each other; that God has no less the quality of the best 
monarch than that of the greatest architect; that matter is so disposed that the laws of 
motion serve as the best guidance for spirits; and that consequently it will prove that 
25.  For a discussion of this relationship and its tensions, see Rutherford 1995: 46-67; Adams 2014.
26.  Théodicée, §118 (GP VI, 168-169).
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he has attained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical, 
physical and moral goods together.27 
3.2. The Finalization of Nature: Justice through Nature
It remains to be seen, how this harmony is conceived by Leibniz. Here one can see 
how Leibniz – while seemingly abandoning Malebrache’s audacious exportation of the 
nomological model of natural science into theology, and striving at estabilishing by 
contrast a neat division of fields – by this same move comes to formulate in a crystal 
clear way the same problem already confronted by the Oratorian, namely the problem 
posed to theological and moral thought by the new scientific view of the world.
His very general requirement is that the system of nature, unfolding according 
to its own rules, at the same time does satisfy the moral requirements. The task is 
especially arduous, notice, insofar as for Leibniz, more than for Malebranche (who 
admits, though in his peculiarly indirect and mediated form, an interaction bettween 
the mental and the physical), the system of natural laws is a perfectly self-closed one. 
Thus, Leibniz is eager to emphasize, that no interference is admitted in the sphere 
of the laws of nature:
And this takes place, not by a dislocation of nature, as if what God has planned for 
souls could disturb the laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural things itself, by 
virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time between the realms of nature and 
of grace, between God as architect and God as monarch, in such a way that nature 
leads to grace, and grace perfects nature by using it.28
Consider also that the same beings do belong to both realms, insofar as, e.g., human 
beings are subjected both to the natural laws, as embodied souls, and to the jurisdiction 
of the moral law, as citizens of the ‘city of God’. As Leibniz puts it, the realm of grace 
is a “moral world within the natural world”.
Moreover, something more than a mere coordination – as in the case of the classic 
explanation of the body/soul relationship given by pre-established harmony – seems to be 
required, because the outcomes of one set of laws must be subordinated to the other one.29
But how can this preminence of moral finalism, and the corresponding harmo-
ny, be figured out in a plausible way? A first and straightforward way is to claim that, 
contrary to the appearances, the working of nature – the ‘blind’ mechanism of the laws 
of physical motion, or the psychological dynamism of appetites often directed towards 
only seeming goods – ultimately ends up promoting the moral ends to be pursued, in 
27.  Théodicée, §247 (GP VI, 264).
28.  PNG, GP VI, 605, L 640.
29.  In a sense, of course, the case is the same: in the nature/grace harmony there is no more 
than a coordination; conversely, also in the ‘physical’ (i.e., non moral) harmony of soul and 
body one can tell of a (relative) subordination, insofar as the reason for a certain modification 
can be found in one of the terms better than in the other. But the issue is exactly that with the 
moral harmony Leibniz seems to be committed to a general one-sided distribution of reasons 
on behalf of the ‘moral’ rule. 
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particular the correct retribution of human actions.
This might seem, of course, a completely gratuitous assumption. Sometimes Leibniz 
seems to have in mind the idea that moral handling coincides with the correct working of 
human nature, so that virtue is (as Spinoza would say) the reward for itself, while vice takes 
with itself its punishment: 
It can (…) be said that God as architect satisfies God as lawgiver in everything and 
that sins must therefore carry their punishment with them by the order of nature, 
and even by virtue of the mechanical structure of things; and that noble actions, 
similarly, attain their rewards through ways that are mechanical in relation to 
bodies, although this cannot and should not always happen at once.30
This moral outcome of natural processes, however, is not so evident in a lot of cases. 
Hence the final clause, which projects the ‘harmony’ into a more or less remote future 
– be it the time of an entire human life, or a properly eschatological one.
Remember how Malebranche invoked the fact of the original sin, in order to ex-
plain the disconcerting disharmony between the working out of nature and its alleged 
moral ends. Leibniz does not focus his attention on this explanation: in this case also, 
his view of the ‘kingdom of grace’, differently from that of the French theologian, is 
not essentially connected (while leaving a possible room for it) to what is specific to the 
story of Christian redemption. 
The disharmony of the two kingdoms does not only concern the conflict of ten-
dencies within rational agents, but also the topic of natural disasters – another one 
attentively considered in Malebranche’s theodicy. Also these phenomena, according to 
Leibniz, should be assumed to have a ‘moral’ justification, though difficult to see from 
our very limited perspective. 
To this kind of consideration seem to point also some rather cryptic allusions 
concerning the alleged harmony between the story of our planet and the moral story of 
its inhabitants. These allusions can be interpreted in general along a strictly orthodox 
idea – to be found also in Malebranche – according to which the original sin corrupted 
also nature, and conversely, according to St. Paul’s dictum (“the whole creation groans 
with us and shares our birth pangs”), redemption will involve nature itself. 
More interestingly, we are faced with the attempt at suggesting a “moral” account 
of the most recent discoveries and discussions concerning the story of earth; discoveries 
that could easily appear at odds with the biblical teaching. Leibniz, in fact, is suggest-
ing that the big natural changes in the earth’s general conditions harmonize with the 
moral requirements of God’s global plan:
The result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by means of the very ways of 
nature and that this globe, for example, must be destroyed and repaired by natural 
ways at those times which the government of spirits demands for the punishment of 
some and the rewards of others. 31
 
30.  Monadologie, §89, L 652. 
31.  Monadologie, §88, L 652.
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Compare this with a passage in Thomas Burnet’s Telluris theoria sacra, (1681), whose 
author – after giving a ‘physical’ explanation of the universal deluge – warns that this 
does not compromise the biblical interpretation of the deluge as a divine punishment:
It is no detraction from divine providence, that the course of nature is exact and 
regular, and that even in its greatest Changes and Revolutions it should still conspire 
and be prepared to answer the Ends and Purposes of the divine Will in reference to 
the moral world. This seems to me to be the great Art of Divine Providence, so 
to adjust the two Worlds, human and natural, material and intellectual, as seeing 
through the Possibilities and Futuritions of each, according to the first States and 
Circumstances he puts them under, they should all along correspond and fit one 
another, and especially in their great Crises and Periods.32
Elsewhere Leibniz goes on to illustrate the same idea with some audacious speculations 
put forward by contemporary Origenists: this is the case with the theology well-nigh 
astronomical referred to in the Theodicy: “Simultaneously (by virtue of the harmonic 
parallelism of the Realms of Nature and of Grace) this long and great conflagration will 
have purged the earth’s globe of its stains.”33
This grand view of the changes of our world, however, leaves the possibility of 
realizing justice still unclear, if the persistence of the same moral subject is not granted. 
I am speaking, notice, of ‘moral subject’, because the simple persistence (or imperisha-
bility) is already metaphysically assured for all simple substances. But the order of the 
‘city of God’, with the related retributive justice, requires something more, that is to say 
that the same self-conscious being persists, endowed with the memory of her/his past 
actions. Accordingly, several passages in the texts on the nature/grace harmony insist 
on the preservation of the same person, despite the continuous and radical transforma-
tions to which the physical world is subjected (“beyond the revolutions of matter”).34
As a matter of fact, what Leibniz wants to get from his harmony is nothing but 
that final conciliation of subjective consciousness and divine justice whose need was 
emphasized also by John Locke, and which should have been assured by the doctrine of 
the Last Judgment, together with a final eschatological reconciliation of soul and body, 
of virtue and happiness. 
 
32.  Burnet 1689: I, 146.
33.  Théodicée, §18 (GP VI, 113). These speculations are connected to Leibniz’s interest for the 
topic of Apokathastasis and his relationship with the heterodox and millenarian theologian 
Petersen. See on this Fichant 1991 and Costa 2014. 
34.  For the idea of being subtracted to the “revolutions of matter”, see the Nouveau système 
(note 13 above) and Mendelson 1995. For the immortality of minds as a key element in the 
‘kingdom of grace’, see already Discours, §36 (note 12 above) and the letter to Wagner of 
June 1710: “as soon as [human souls], however, are made rational, and capable, together of 
being self-conscious, of partnership with God, I am persuaded that from then on they never 
lose their personal quality of citiziens of God’s republic; and becuase this republic is ruled in 
the rightest and most beautiful way, it follows that these souls, through the selfsame laws of 
nature, because of parallelism between grace and nature, are made by their actions apt to receive 
reward or punishment” (GP VII, 531).
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It is worth noting, however, that this eschatological outcome seems to be thought of by 
Leibniz – though in a largely ambiguous and nuanced way – in a more intra-mundane 
way. That is to say, the reconciliation of nature with the moral ends of the ‘kingdom 
of grace’, both on the global and individual plan, is projected into the future; but this 
seems to be a future still belonging to the (admittedly, dramatic) development of our 
(and God’s) unique world.35
conclusions: kant on the realms of nature and grace
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method, Kant at a point relies explicitly on 
Leibniz’s legacy, by taking again his idea of the realms of nature and grace:
Leibniz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational beings which 
it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the 
government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it 
from the kingdom of Nature, in which these rational beings live, under moral 
laws, indeed, but expect no other consequences from their actions than such as 
follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, 
therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in 
so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which render us un-
worthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.36
We are not faced, indeed, with a merely terminological recovery: Kant’s idea seems to 
be objectively in staightforward continuity with Leibniz’s approach, and the conceptual 
framework expressed by the idea of the Leibnizian ‘Kingdom of grace’ is largely taken 
again by him from a transcendental point of view. We have on one hand the natural 
world (embracing both the physical one and that of empirical psychology), ruled by 
causal laws; on the other, the laws of morality, or of practical reason (binding all ra-
tional beings, God included, like for Malebranche and Leibniz). The realm of grace 
is, properly, the idea of the union of the two, or of their reconciliation: what Kant 
technically labels by his notion of ‘supreme good’. Although the way of conceiving 
the relation of happiness with moral intention is, of course, different from Leibniz’s, 
still the fundamental idea (or problem) formulated by Leibniz is there: I mean, the 
requirement of a reconciliation of the scientific and the moral view of world – which 
will be a major theme in the whole classic German philosophy. Not only our immor-
tality, but God’s eixistence itself are now definitely taken as postulates derived from 
the assumption of the moral law. Interestingly enough, in Kant’s view, this requirement 
concerning the ‘moral nature of nature’ is ideally conjoined with another element we 
have found in Malebranche – while being in Leibniz, though not absent, more bal-
anced by other considerations – namely, the emphasis on the universal character of 
rules and the extension of this formal character to both realms of nature and moral.
35.  This intra-mundane character of future harmony is emphasized in Phemister 2003.
36.  CPR, 539; Ch. II, Sect. 2, A812, B840: Transcendental Doctrine of Method.
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abbreviations
Abbreviations to editions of Leibniz’s works follow the citation conventions of Studia Leibnitiana.
CPR = I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, London, G. Bell & Sons, 1893.
L = G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, transl. and ed. by L. E. Lomeker, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 1956.
OM = N. Malebranche, Ouevres complètes, éd. par A. Robinet, Paris, Vrin, 1958-1984; vol. V, 1958.
R = G. W. Leibniz, Treatise on Nature and Grace, transl., with an introduction and notes by P. Riley, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
references
Adams, R. M. 2014. “Justice, Happiness and Perfection in Leibniz’s City of God”, in New Essays on 
Leibniz’s Theodicy, ed. by L. M. Jorgensen and S. Newlands, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp. 197-217.
Burnet, Th. 1689. Telluris theoria sacra orbis nostrae originem et mutationes generales… complectens, 
London, Norton, 1689, transl. by J. Addison, The Sacred Theory of the Earth, Hooke, London, 
1719.
Costa, A. 2014. “L’étrange cas de la ‘théologie presque astronomique’ des Essais de Théodicée”, Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas, 3/5, pp. 2:1-2:26.
Fichant, M. 1991. Introduction, in G. W. Leibniz, De l’ horizon de la doctrine humaine. La restitution 
universelle, Paris, Vrin.
Gilson, E. 1952. Les métamorphoses de la cité de Dieu, Paris, Vrin.
Grua, G. 1953. Jurisprudence universelle et théodicée selon Leibniz, Paris, PUF; repr. in The Yale Leibniz, 
New York, Garland, 1985.
Guardini, R. 1950. Das Ende der Neuzeit, Basel, Hess.
Gueroult, M. 1959. Malebranche, III. Les cinq abîmes de la Providence. La nature et la grâce, Paris, 
Aubier.
Mendelson, M. 1995. “Beyond the Revolutions of Matter. Mind, Body and Pre-established Harmony 
in the Earlier Leibniz”, Studia Leibnitiana, 27/1, pp. 31- 66.
Phemister, P. 2003. “Exploring Leibniz’s Kingdoms: A Philosophical Analysis of Nature and Grace”, 
Ecotheology. Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture, 7, pp. 126-145.
Robinet, A. 1955. Malebranche et Leibniz: relations personnelles, Paris, Vrin.
Rutherford, D. 1995. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Stefano Di Bella
Università Statale di Milano 
stefano.dibella@unimi.it
ORCID: 0000-0003-4506-8781
